Section I: Introduction
Depending on the study one picks, the empirical work on income inequality and economic growth finds that their relationship is positive, negative, insignificant or non-linear. The profusion of conflicting evidence leads Banerjee and Duflo (2000: 17) to ask rhetorically, "Is there anything then, apart from the obvious fact of disagreement, that we can take away from this body of evidence?" I argue here that rather than being obvious, the disagreement apparent in the empirical work on inequality and growth is in fact illusory. What has been interpreted as contradictory evidence on "the relationship" between growth and inequality is, in fact, consistent evidence on two separate relationships, one across countries and the other over time.
The current confusion over the empirical evidence has its roots in a theoretical literature that tends to treat either growth or inequality as exogenous. One line of research follows Kuznets' (1956) emphasis on the dynamics of dualistic development. 1 In these models, the evolution of inequality is investigated while modern sector expansion, a proxy for economic development, is treated as automatic. The other line of research follows Kaldor (1956) in investigating the channels through which the initial distribution of income might influence subsequent accumulation and growth.
2 As Lundberg and Squire (2003: 326) note, "Neither approach is particularly convincing from a theoretical standpoint: the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes." This paper employs an alternative theoretical framework in which both inequality and growth are endogenous functions of underlying policy variables. This adds a degree of conceptual freedom to the frameworks described above, making it relatively straightforward to develop a model that accounts for the empirical record in a coherent and consistent fashion. Indeed, I describe a set of sufficient conditions for a family of models capable of doing so. I also develop one such model in detail as an illustration. 3 A major implication of the paper is that there may not be any causal relationship between inequality and growth. If this is true, then there is not a meaningful answer to the question that has occupied so much of the recent work in this area, Persson and Tabillini's (1994) query, "Is inequality harmful for growth?" It may be more useful to ask instead, "Are the particular conditions that determine the level of inequality in a given country good or bad for growth?" This attempt to refocus the debate on particular policy instruments will appeal to researchers who found themselves uneasy with the idea that anything one does to reduce income inequality will necessarily increase, or decrease, growth. Depending on the instrument in question, the impact on growth may be positive or negative. In addition, the direct effects of a policy change on growth may swamp any indirect effect operating through its impact on inequality.
The next section describes the primary "stylized facts" of growth and inequality and outlines the characteristics of a family of models consistent with these facts. The third section selects a particular member of this family for further investigation, and the fourth section presents the model. Section five uses the model to interpret the existing evidence on inequality and growth. Section six discusses the sensitivity of the model's predictions to critical assumptions. The final section concludes.
Section II: Stylized Facts and a Family of Models Fact 1: Growth and inequality vary inversely across countries.
The first stylized fact is supported by cross-country growth regressions in which initial inequality is negatively and significantly related to subsequent growth. 4 Figure 1 displays this relationship. The line shows the best fit of an OLS regression of the average growth rate, 1975-1995, on initial income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient in 1975 and initial income. The two variables are strongly related. An increase in the Gini of one standard deviation is associated with a fall in the average growth rate of more than one percent per year.
Despite its strength, however, this relationship is not robust, being sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables, such as regional dummy variables (Deiniger and Squire, 1998) and measures of fertility (Barro 2000, de la Croix and Doepke 2003) . Furthermore, as Forbes (2000) points out, crosscountry growth regressions are particularly prone to omitted variable bias.
Fact 2: Growth and inequality vary directly within countries.
The second stylized fact is supported by and Forbes (2000) . These studies use panel estimation techniques (fixed effects and general method of moments, respectively), and find that within countries growth rises with inequality. These findings are important because their use of countryspecific intercepts controls for the effect of time-invariant omitted variables that may bias the cross-country results as noted above. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship using 5 yearly data from 1970 to 1995 and controlling for initial income and country and period fixed effects. This relationship is also very strong. A one-standard deviation increase in inequality is associated with a 1.88% increase in the average growth rate.
Notes to Figure 1:
Average growth rates computed from Summers and Heston, 6.1. Gini coefficients are from Deiniger and Squire (1996) high quality data set with adjustments for differences in methodology. Data cover 60 countries. The estimated equation is grow7595 = 0.76 -1.33E-06*income75 -0.0011*Gini1975. The figure shows the best fit OLS regression of growth 1975-1995 on initial inequality controlling for initial income. Li, Squire and Zou (1998) report that inequality is relatively constant within countries during the post-war period. Indeed, they find that "about 90% of the total variance in the Gini coefficients can be explained by variation across countries, while only a small percentage of the total variance is due to variation over time" (p. 26-27) .
The third fact has two implications for how one interprets the other two. First, as Li et al. note, this finding implies that inequality is primarily determined by factors that differ across space rather than time, providing further support for Forbes ' (2000) concerns over the role of time-invariant omitted variables in crosscountry regressions. On the other hand, it suggests that one ought not to attach too much importance to the positive relationship found using panel data. While this result is arguably based on superior econometric techniques, the variation in inequality that drives it is in fact only a small part of the overall story. The big story must lie elsewhere.
A Family of Models
This subsection describes sufficient conditions for a model that is able to account for the stylized facts of growth and inequality. These conditions may be thought of as describing a family of "endogenous inequality-endogenous growth" models that is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
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Let the equilibrium growth rate and Gini coefficient be given respectively by )
, where X and Y are sets of exogenous variables. These functions conform to the following assumption:
Variations in x will cause growth and inequality to vary inversely.
. Variations in y will cause growth and inequality to vary directly.
Assumption 3:
The elements of X vary substantially across countries but are relatively constant within countries over time, while the elements of Y vary either primarily over time or relatively equally in both dimensions.
Assumption 4:
The elements of X rather than Y are the primary determinants of inequality, in the sense that variations in the elements of X are responsible for most of the observed variation in inequality.
Taken together, assumptions 1 and 3 support the first stylized fact; assumptions 2 and 3 support the second stylized fact; and assumptions 3 and 4 support the third stylized fact. Note that no assumption is made here about a direct impact of inequality on growth or vice-versa. With growth and inequality 5 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) argue that the findings of the cross-country and panel studies are consistent with a political economy model in which growth falls in response to a change in inequality. There is no reason to think of their explanation as competing with the one proposed here. Their model does not attempt to account for our third stylized fact, the greater variation in inequality across than within countries. treated as endogenous variables, a direct relationship between them is not necessary to account for the stylized facts noted above. 6 As a result, our assumptions imply that both cross-country and panel regressions are mis-specified in that the impact of inequality on growth is driven by omitted variables.
Section III: Redistributive Taxation and Restrictive Institutions
As the discussion above suggests, it should be possible to find several variables that satisfy the conditions set on X and Y. This supposition is supported by Lundberg and Squire (2003) in an empirical study that treats both growth and inequality as endogenous. They find several policy variables that cause either direct or inverse variation in growth rates and inequality. While they do not consider whether these variables fulfill assumptions 3 and 4, their result suggest that the family of models outlined above may provide a rich vein for further research.
The Choice of Y -Redistributive Taxation
Clarity of intuition guides our choice of Y as redistributive taxation. Proportional income taxation coupled with uniform transfers redistributes income progressively, reducing the inequality of post-transfer income. Income taxes also reduce the return to capital, blunting the incentive for accumulation and reducing the growth rate. In a simple model, variations in the income tax rate result in a positive relationship between inequality and growth: higher tax rates correspond to greater equality and slower growth.
Despite the simple intuition, the argument that redistribution blunts growth is controversial. With frictionless capital markets, taxes on capital income will decrease growth by distorting investment decisions Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994) . With capital market imperfections, redistribution or the public provision of education may allow the poor to overcome credit constraints, increasing the growth rate.
7 Moreover, empirical support for the growth-reducing impact of redistribution is, at best, mixed, e.g. Perotti (1996) . The lack of compelling empirical support may be due to the difficulty of constructing an adequate empirical measure of redistribution. Such a measure would account for the redistributionary effects of a variety of policy instruments including trade policy, the regulation of labor markets, inflation, corruption and the structure of government spending. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (2000) present evidence that urban governments use public employment as a mechanism to disguise redistribution. As Alesina and Rodrik (1994: 479) note, "It would be an almost impossible task to construct a meaningful cross-country index for the totality of such measures."
The Choice of X -Restrictive Institutions
The choice of X is motivated primarily by Sokoloff and Engermann's (2000) study of relative development in North and South America. Sokoloff and Engermann argue that factor endowments and the resulting political inequality at the time of colonization led to divergent paths of institutional and economic development. In particular, high initial inequality "contributed to the evolution of institutions that protected the privileges of the elites and restricted opportunities for the broad mass of the population to participate fully in the commercial economy" (p. 221). Sokoloff and Engermann suggest that the effect of these restrictive institutions was to increase inequality while retarding development: "Members of the elites were better able to maintain their elite status over time, but at the cost of society not realizing the full economic potential of disadvantaged groups" (p. 228-230).
As required by Assumption 3, most of the variance in restrictive institutions is likely to be across rather than within countries, at least over the lengths of time typically investigated in growth empirical exercises. Indeed, institutional persistence is a central theme in the work on institutions and growth, e.g. North (1990) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) . Assumption 1 requires that a change in X move growth and inequality in opposite directions. The idea that institutional quality affects economic growth is so well established as not to require further comment, e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995) , Mauro (1995) , Rodrik (2000) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly (2001) , but the idea of a link between restrictive institutions and inequality is new. Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) find that restrictive institutions manifest themselves through an influence on the pattern of land tenure, the provision of 8 The restrictiveness of institutions is likely to capture institutional variation along a somewhat different dimension than that implied by "institutional quality," which often treated as synonymous with the protection of property rights. For example, the abolition of slavery in the US both reduced barriers to non-elite economic participation and violated previously protected property rights. In practice, however, elements of high quality institutions such as an independent judiciary and the rule of law require an egalitarianism that is likely to be incompatible with highly restrictive institutions. public education, the regulation of financial organizations, and restrictions on political participation. This list fits well with empirical evidence presented by , who find that a large proportion of the variation in income inequality is accounted for by variations in land inequality, financial development, educational attainment and civil liberties. Engermann and Sokoloff's list also accords nicely with a number of themes in the theoretical literature. Unequal access to credit plays a critical role in the literature on inequality and capital market imperfections. This literature also stresses the importance of an equitable distribution of land, an important source of collateral, and publicly funded education as means to overcome credit constraints. Finally, an important line of the research on political economy and inequality, e.g. Benabou (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) , gives a central role to unequal or restricted political participation.
Picking a Single Element of X: Barriers to Formality
The discussion above suggest that, as a group, restrictive institutions are a plausible candidate for the set of variables X: they are relatively stable within countries over time, positive related to inequality, and negatively related to growth. As enumerated above, however, restrictive institutions are too diverse in their effects to be addressed in a single model. For this reason I focus on a particular form of restriction which has not received attention in the recent growth-inequality literature: regulatory barriers to formal sector participation.
The pioneering work of Hernando de Soto (1990) provides a compelling account of the impact of restrictive institutions on informal sector participation: in one case the cost of complying with existing regulations equaled 28 times the monthly minimum wage. De Soto's conjecture has been confirmed by a number of cross-country empirical studies that seek to quantify the relationship between regulatory restrictions and informality, e.g. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shliefer (2002) , Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) , Johnson, Kaufman and Shliefer (1997) and Botero et al. (2003) .
The intuitive link between informality and inequality, suggested by terms such as "underemployment" and "marginality," has not been extensively researched. However, two recent papers by Ahmed (2000, 2003) , report a positive relationship between levels and changes in income inequality and informal sector share in transition economies. Ahmed, Rosser and Rosser (2004) extend this analysis, finding that the informal sector share is a significant determinant of income inequality in a sample of 52 countries.
With its focus on the relationships between institutions, informality, inequality and growth, this paper is related to several lines of research. A number of papers have investigated the relationships between institutions, inequality, and growth, but their emphasis has been on how inequality influences institutions, e.g. Easterly (2001) , Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shliefer (2003) , Keefer and Knack (2002) . Here, causation runs in the opposite direction, from institutions to inequality.
The model is also related to the growing literature on informality. 9 A central issue in this literature is the role of taxation in informality. Unlike the model presented here, however, in most of this literature tax revenues fund productive public goods rather than redistribution, e.g. Johnson et al. (1997) and Dessy and Palange (2003) , and links to inequality and growth are not explored. Closer to our model is Loayza (1996) , which investigates the relationships between taxation, regulation and inequality in an endogenous growth model. A key difference is that in Loayza's model taxation funds public goods rather than redistribution. As a result, his model has no Y variables, and thus cannot account for the stylized facts of growth and inequality outlined above.
Bandyopadhyay and Basu (2005) develop a model based on the distinction between workers and managers that is able to account for Barro's (2000) finding that inequality and growth are negatively related in poor countries and positively related in rich countries. In contrast with Bandyopadhyay and Basu's emphasis on the occupational distinction between workers and managers, this paper focuses on restrictive institutions and the sectoral division between formal and informal sector participants. Furthermore, in addition to being able to account for Barro's evidence (see section V), our model may also be used to understand why growth and inequality vary differently within and across countries.
In a recent empirical paper, Davis and Hopkins (2006) find evidence that supports our central claims regarding the relationships between institutions, inequality and growth. In both cross-country and random effects panel regressions, they find that when both inequality and a common measure of institutional quality are included as regressors, institutions matter for growth but inequality does not. These results are confirmed for both cross-country and random effects panel data models using a simultaneous equations framework that takes both growth and inequality as dependent variables. They are also robust to the inclusion of regional and geographic controls and to the use of instruments to control for potential reverse causation and the endogeneity of institutions. Davis and Hopkins do not find evidence to support the role of redistribution suggested here. As noted earlier, this may be due to difficulties in finding empirical proxies for the intensity of redistribution.
Section IV: Formal Model
In arguing for a link between informality and inequality, this paper follows in the development economics tradition established by Kuznets (1965) and Lewis (1954) of treating inequality as a manifestation of economic dualism. I depart from this literature, however, in a number of ways. Most importantly, I treat growth as endogenous, rather than tracking the changes in income inequality that would result from modern sector expansion. More specifically, I formalize the proposition that the formal sector is the "engine of growth." The growth rate of the economy becomes a function of modern sector participation and thus of the extent of dualism. Second, dualism is expressed in the formal-informal distinction, which operates along legal and technological dimensions. In particular, informality results from policy-induced distortions, specifically regulations restricting formal sector access (De Soto, 1990 ).
Production and Income
Agents are distributed uniformly on the unit continuum and indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Agent i is endowed with h i units of human capital and i units of "ability." The salient characteristics of ability are that it is inherited and cannot be accumulated. Because ability plays a key role in allowing an agent to take advantage of human capital spillovers, ability may be interpreted as intellectual ability or IQ. The role of ability in the model is discussed further in section 5. The distribution of ability defines a natural level of income inequality that would prevail in the absence of distortions.
Agent i may produce in the formal (F) or informal (I) sector with outputs given by
where subscripts I and F indicate an agent's sector, the A's are productivity parameters, α ∈ (0, 1), and I and F are the sets of informal and formal sector participants.
The productivity parameters reflect the impact of formal sector human capital spillovers. Identifying spillovers with the formal sector acknowledges that, in practice, the formal sector employs more intensively those types of capital generally associated with spillovers: human and knowledge capital. More able agents and formal sector participants are better able to capture these spillovers and, thus, enjoy productivity premia. 10 The productivity parameters take the form:
where H F is total formal sector human capital.
11 The spillover effect in (2) formalizes the idea that the formal sector is the "engine of growth."
Formal sector income is subject to proportional taxation at rate τ. Tax revenues are distributed uniformly, with each agent receiving a transfer x. Agent i's income is given by
If the tax rate is sufficiently high to completely offset the formal sector productivity premium, then all agents opt for informality. With no formal sector, the model produces a degenerate outcome in which the productivity parameter A i is uniformly zero for all agents. This level of taxation would be hard to support as a political equilibrium. To avoid this outcome, I assume that the tax rate is upwardly bounded τ < 1-γ ≡ τ max , so that the formal sector enjoys a net productivity premium:
The size of the transfer is found by integrating tax revenues across formal sector participants,
Regulatory Barriers and Sectoral Participation
I model the regulatory barriers very simply. It is assumed that an agent is only allowed to participate in the formal sector is her earnings (income less transfers) exceed some threshold level. This threshold is defined as a fixed fraction β < 1 of the (pretax) earnings of the most able individual. Higher levels of β correspond to greater barriers to formality. The requirement for formal sector participation is thus
where the earnings are given by
12 Since (5) implies the most able agent is always a formal sector participant, in the future I omit the subscript "F" in referring to her, e.g.
. This manner of modeling regulation corresponds to several common regulatory structures. First, formal sector participation may be limited by minimum wage legislation. Agents whose market determined wage would fall below this level are barred from formal sector employment. With a CobbDouglas production technology, there is a direct relationship between a minimum wage and the minimum income restriction used here. Second, many less developed countries employ minimum capital requirements for registering a new firm (see World Bank, 2004, 118-20) . As shown below, in the steady state formal sector capital and earnings are linear in agent ability, making capital and earnings restrictions equivalent. Finally, formal sector employment may be rationed by educational attainment, which may be viewed as a form of minimum capital requirement.
Dynamic Structure
The model employs a non-overlapping generations structure. Relative to other dynamic structures, this sharpens the analysis in the presence of multiple equilibria. Each agent lives for one period and has one child. Children inherit their parent's ability, implying that ability uniquely identifies families as well as particular agents. The utility of generation t of agent i is
Note that sectoral participation is not sensitive to the tax rate. Dessy and Pallage (2003) show the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on sectoral participation. In addition, Johnson et al. (1997) find that informality among transition economies is related to perceptions of "tax fairness" but not statutory tax rates.
where c i,t is the agent's own consumption, c i,t+1 is the child's, and ε > 0 is a measure of parental affection.
The evolution of human capital obeys 
Human Capital and Income in the Steady State
In the steady state a family's return to human capital is constant across generations, and human capital and income grow at a common rate. Differentiating sectoral incomes from (3) with respect to human capital and substituting for sectoral productivity parameters given by (2), agent i's return to human capital is given by
For agent i's income to grow at a constant rate, her return to human capital must be constant. In either sector, this condition requires that the agent's human capital must grow at the same rate as the formal sector capital stock. It follows that for every agent to experience steady state growth, all agents' human capital must grow at the same rate as H F . This implies that the return to capital is uniform across agents: for all i, j ∈ [0, 1], As seen in (9), in both sectors the steady state level of human capital is linear in ability, with the human capital of the most able agent (i = 1) serving as a reference point. Equation (9) also implies that informal sector production is less human capital intensive than formal sector production. For a given level of ability, informal sector participation lowers an agent's steady state human capital, a(τ) < 1, a result that follows directly from the formal sector's net productivity premium. Note that a rise in the tax rate reduces this premium and consequently reduces the gap between formal and informal sector human capital, 0 ) ( ' > τ a . Each agent assumes that the stock of formal sector human capital is unaffected by her decisions. She treats the evolution of the sectoral productivity parameters as given in making her own accumulation decisions. Abstracting for the moment from sectoral participation decisions, diminishing marginal private returns to human capital drive an essentially neoclassical convergence process. It is the convergence of each individual's human capital to its steady state level, rather than the existence of an efficient capital market, that equalizes the return to human capital across individuals in the steady state. Figure 3 illustrates sectoral returns to capital and steady state human capital for a representative agent i.
Substituting (9) into (3), one can derive steady state incomes of formal and informal sector participants. In each sector, steady state income levels are linear in ability: . Using this benchmark facilitates the relative income comparisons that underlie measures of inequality. In particular, (10) indicates that relative incomes are determined by 1) ability, 2) transfer size, 3) sectoral participation, and 4) the sectoral productivity gap, which is reflected in a(τ).
Sectoral Participation in the Steady State
We have yet to determine in which sector each agent participates in the steady state. As noted above, sectoral participation influences relative incomes and, consequently, inequality. Because the return to human capital depends on the size of the formal sector human capital spillover, sectoral participation outcomes affect the equilibrium growth rate as well. The existence of a formal sector productivity premium ensures that formality is preferred by all agents and is in fact chosen provided current income is sufficiently high, as described by (5). What complicates the determination of steady state sectoral participation is that current income may depend on the participation outcomes of earlier generations, and thus on the initial distribution of human capital.
For some families, steady state sectoral participation does not depend initial conditions. Regardless of initial conditions, a family with sufficiently low ability, β < i , will be unable to sustain formality because its steady state formal sector earnings will fall below the threshold defined by (5). Similarly, a family with sufficiently high level of ability, ) (τ β a i > , will eventually accumulate sufficient capital to join the formal sector: in the steady state even its informal sector earnings exceed the threshold. For families with ability levels that fall between these two critical values, steady state sectoral participation depends on the distribution of initial human capital endowments.
Because both growth and inequality depend on sectoral participation, the model indicates a role for history, or initial conditions, in determining the current pattern of growth and inequality across countries. This "path dependence" is widely recognized in the literature, and our focus here is on the role of policy, rather than history, in accounting for the empirical record. In keeping with this limited objective, I restrict attention in what follows to initial allocations of human capital that highlight the role of policy. 
Growth and Policy in the Steady State
Combining (13) with (7) and (9), the steady state growth rate may be expressed as a function of our two policy variables: An increase in taxes slows growth by reducing the after-tax return to capital. Greater barriers to formality reduce the number of formal sector participants, lowering the formal sector knowledge spillovers and reducing growth. Figure 4 show iso-growth loci in the β−τ policy space, which are defined by combinations of β and τ that generate the same rate of steady state growth. The origin corresponds to the maximum growth rate, which occurs in the absence of redistribution and barriers to formality, Examination shows that the iso-growth lines become flatter in β and steeper in τ, which accounts for their portrayal as "bowed-out."
The lines in

Income Inequality and Policy in the Steady State
Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, which ranges from zero to one, with a higher value indicating greater inequality. The Gini may be derived as the sum of the absolute value of all pairwise income differentials divided by average income. The Gini coefficient may be thought of as the expected income difference between two individuals relative to average income (Pyatt, 1976) . (For the derivation of the Gini coefficient and the following comparative static results, please see the appendix.) The Gini coefficient for our economy may be expressed as a function of the policy variables and model parameters:
Differentiating the Gini coefficient with respect to the tax rate, we find that taxation reduces inequality: G τ < 0. A rise in the tax rate reduces the inequality of earnings in both the formal and informal sectors, the latter effect operating through the impact of taxes on the level of steady state informal sector human capital. In addition, it reduces the gap between formal and informal sector incomes. Since all taxes are redistributed, taxation has no effect on average income. Iso-Growth Lines: heavy downward sloping curves showing combinations of β and τ that generate the same growth rate. Growth is increasing as one moves toward the origin: g 0 < g 1 < g 2 . The origin corresponds to the maximum growth rate, g max .
LA US EU
Lower growth and higher inequality
Lower growth and lower inequality
Differentiating the inequality index with respect to β, we find that G β > 0 for β ≤ ½. That is, a country with higher barriers to formal sector participation will have greater income inequality. An increase in the informal sector share has three separate impacts on inequality. First, it lowers average income (relative to our reference variable, h 1 ), increasing inequality. Second, inequality falls because incomes are more uniform in the informal than formal sector. Third, inequality is increasing in the gap between average income in each sector and in the probability that two randomly chosen individuals come from different sectors. This probability is maximized when sector employment shares are equal, or β = ½, and falls thereafter as the informal sector expands.
Taken together, these comparative static imply that for β ≤ ½, isoinequality loci are upwardly sloping in the β−τ policy space:
. These loci are shown in Figure 4 . Inequality rises as ones moves up the graph and to the left: G 0 < G 1 < G 2 . In addition, the line labeled G 1 passes through the origin, implying it corresponds to the level of inequality that holds in the absence of distortions:
Transition Dynamics
Here we examine the model's behavior during the transition between steady state equilibria in response to a tax policy shock. In general the analysis supports the intuition developed by considering steady state equilibrium. Consider an economy with policies β and 0 τ in the steady state. The share of parents who work in the informal sector is β , the return to capital is constant across families and sectors, and the economy grows at a constant rate From equation (8), the return to human capital in the formal sector depends both on the tax rate and the ratio of individual to sectoral human capital: . It follows that, looking across formal sector participants, the increase in the tax rate causes a uniform decrease in the return human capital, resulting in a uniform fall in the rate of human capital accumulation. Formal sector human capital F H is the sum of individual human capital stocks, so it also grows at this new lower rate. Because individual and sectoral human capital grows at the same rate, their ratio is unchanged from its steady state level, and the formal sector transition to the new steady state occurs in a single period. Even though informal participants avoid taxation, the informal sector also experiences an immediate decline in the rate of economic growth. This decline because the reduced rate of growth of formal sector human capital lowers the return to capital in the informal sector,
The full informal sector transition is, however, gradual, as individual levels of human capital rise relative to the formal sector human capital stock, causing the return to human capital to fall. As the return to informal sector human capital falls, individual levels of human capital converge on their the new steady state level, and rates of The formal and informal sector transitions are depicted in Figure 5 . Economy-wide, per capita income growth is a weighted average of sectoral income growth rates, with sectoral output shares as weights:
Because formal sector participants have higher incomes, income growth rates are dominated by the formal sector dynamics. For example, with one third of the workers in the informal sectors and maximum allowable tax rates ( 1 τ γ = − ), the formal sector share produces over 88% of output. Because of this, income dynamics are dominated by immediate growth transition in the formal sector. The rise in the tax rate coincides with an immediate drop in the growth rate caused by the rapid formal sector transition and the partial transition of the informal sector. Thereafter, the economy converges more slowly as the rates of accumulation and income growth in the informal sector gradually decline. The evolution of income inequality follows a similar pattern. The increase in the tax rate reduces inequality by increasing the size of the uniform transfer payment, reducing the disparity of post-transfer incomes. The rise in the tax rate also immediately reduces the disparity of formal sector earnings. Additional equalization occurs over time as the more rapid accumulation of human capital among informal sector participants reduces the gap between formal and informal sector incomes. Because the initial changes in income growth and inequality are in the same direction as the changes in their steady state levels (there is, for example, no overshooting), the remaining analysis focuses on the steady state values of these variables as shown in Figure 4 . Figure 4 summarizes the primary results of the model. It shows the codetermination of growth and inequality as functions of two underlying policy parameters, β, which measures barriers to formality andτ, which measures the intensity of redistribution.
Section V: Interpretation and Discussion
Moving in the vertical direction we find that growth and inequality vary directly: lower points on the graph are associated with higher growth and lower inequality. Thus, Sokoloff and Engermann's (2000) argument that restrictive institutions have caused Latin America to have lower growth and higher inequality than the US corresponds to Latin American countries being located (on average) higher on the graph than the US, as illustrated by the points labeled "LA" and "US."
Differences in the intensity of redistribution correspond to horizontal shifts in the graph's policy space and result in direct variation between inequality and growth. Consider the common observation, often cited as support for a positive relationship between growth and inequality, that relative to the United States, Western European countries tend to have lower inequality and lower growth rates. Noting that, while the US and Western European countries both enjoy high quality institutions, European countries tend to have more generous social welfare systems, one would locate Europe to the right of the US in the graphs policy space, for example at the point labeled "EU."
More generally, recall that barriers to formality reflect deep institutional structures, which are assumed to vary dramatically across countries but relatively little within countries over time. As a result, cross-country regressions of growth on inequality, like that shown in Figure 1 , will tend to be driven by the crosscountry variation in restrictive institutions, and report that higher inequality is associated with lower growth. Alternately, suppose one uses panel methods to consider the relationship between growth and inequality within countries over time. In this case, institutions are held constant, being absorbed into country specific intercepts. As a result, panel regressions are driven by horizontal movements in Figure 4 's policy space, and as a result tend to report that higher inequality is associated with higher growth.
A potential exception to the interpretation of the evidence given above is Barro's (2000) finding that growth and inequality are positively related in a sample of rich countries. This, however, is an exception that supports the more general rule. In particular, if developed countries are relatively similar in terms of their legal and institutional structures, then most of the variation in the β−τ policy space would be in the horizontal direction. As a result, a cross-country regression restricted to developed countries would tend to find that growth and inequality are positively related.
Section VI: Sensitivity to Critical Assumptions
This section discusses two assumptions that are critical to the model's exposition. These assumptions are that the economy is closed and that inherited ability plays a central role in an agent's access to formal sector spillovers. As argued below, relaxing these assumptions does not overturn the model's ability to account for the relationship between inequality and growth across countries and across time.
International Migration
This section provides an informal discussion of an open economy version of the model with international migration. It considers the case in which migration pressure depends on the ratio of a potential migrant's steady state incomes in the two countries, Home and Abroad indicated by subscripts H and A.
13 Attention to steady state income levels is appropriate if migrants have relatively long time horizons. Relative incomes depend on an agent's ability and international differences in tax policy, institutional structure, and levels of economic development. Other things equal, the role of knowledge spillovers indicates that this income ratio will depend on the relative levels of development of the two countries. Because this factor operates equally across agents of different abilities, however, it should not affect cross-country income inequality.
In contrast, migration pressure due to differences in tax rates does vary across agents.
Suppose both Home and Abroad allow full economic participation, 0 . A rise in Home's rate of redistributional taxation will make it less attractive to high ability agents and more attractive to low ability agents. The out-migration of high ability agents reduces formal sector spillovers, reinforcing the negative effect of higher taxes on economic growth. Migration also reduces income inequality in the Home economy: the steady state incomes of relatively low-ability agents that stay in the home economy is more similar to low-ability immigrants than to the high-ability emigrants. For a similar reasons, growth rises and inequality falls abroad. Allowing for international migration therefore increases growth disparities across countries while decreasing disparities in inequality. Unlike tax policy, which affects the migration incentives of high and low ability agents, differences in institutions have their greatest impact on the migration incentives of agents in the interior of the ability continuum. Abstract from differences in development, set tax rates equal to zero in both countries, and assume that Home has more restrictive barriers to formal sector participation, 0
While all agents would benefit from the higher level human capital spillovers Abroad, migration pressure will be greatest among agents of middle ability,
A H i β β ∈ , for whom migration allows a move from the informal to the formal sector: 
Using the income ratio is consistent with a log linear utility function in which a preference for the home country enters additively:
1 1 ( , , ) ln ln associates these mid-ability migrants with the middle class, then migration in response to institutional differences will tend to increase inequality in the country with more restrictive institutions (Home) and decrease inequality in the country with less restrictive institutions (Abroad). The out-migration of informal sector participant leaves Home's growth rate unchanged. In Abroad, however, lower barriers to formality allow these agents to participate in the formal sector, increasing the size of the human capital spillovers and raising the rate of growth. The net impact of international migration is to increase the role of institutional quality in determining international growth differentials.
This discussion, though clearly incomplete, suggests international migration in response to differences in redistributional taxation and barriers to formal sector participation tends to reinforce the conclusions drawn from analysis of the closed economy model of the previous section.
The Role of Inherited Ability
The model gives a central role to inherited ability as a determinant of sectoral participation, income inequality and economic growth. Moreover, the model predicts that ability, human capital and income levels of children will be perfectly correlated with those of their parents. While empirical work finds that these variables are correlated positively across generations, these correlations are much weaker than predicted by the model, e.g. Bowles and Gintis (2002) .
In the model ability is inherited, cannot be traded or accumulated, and plays a key role in allowing an agent to take advantage of human capital spillovers. While these characteristics may be associated with intellectual ability, other interpretations are also possible. A promising alternative is to reinterpret the index i as a proxy for social status and social capital. As Lucas (1988) argued, human capital spillovers are fundamentally social in nature. Who one works with and rubs elbows with will influence the ideas one is exposed to. The intergenerational persistence of social status will depend in part on parents' ability to pass on their social skills and connections. In addition, when social status is linked to caste, title or racial markers, the intergenerational transmission of social status may be stronger than that of genetically determined characteristics like IQ, e.g. Hertz (2005) . Reinterpreting ability in terms of social status also adds a new policy variable to the model as class structure is more susceptible to policy interventions than is genetic makeup.
However one interprets ability, it is not central to the model's ability to account the primary empirical findings in the literature on inequality and growth. To make this argument explicit, here I continue to use the variable i to index families, but assume that ability does not play a role in knowledge spillovers. In particular (2) Families with i β < will be informal sector participants. In the absence of persistent differences in ability, steady state income levels depend only on sector: given by ( )
These results imply that eliminating ability from the model does not qualitatively alter its conclusions. In the steady state, higher rates of redistributional taxation decrease both the growth rate and the level of income inequality, while more restrictive institutions decrease the growth rate and increase the level of income inequality. Eliminating a role for ability in knowledge spillovers also increases the role of history, in the form of the initial distribution of human capital, in determining current growth rates and inequality levels.
Section VII: Conclusion
Much theoretical work begins with an account of the stylized facts to be explained. Due to conflicting evidence, this has been an awkward exercise for those attempting to explain the relationship between income inequality and growth. For example, some recent papers cite only evidence supporting a positive or a negative relationship. This paper attempts to suggests a way out, interpreting the evidence in a consistent fashion based on whether the variation observed is between or across countries. It does so by proposing a theoretical framework in which both inequality and growth are endogenous variables, functions of more fundamental policy parameters. In doing so, I depart from the current approach of asking "Is inequality harmful for growth," and ask instead "Is the set of policies and institutions that give rise to inequality in a given country good or bad for growth?" This paper suggests that it may be fruitful to focus future research on the joint determination of inequality and growth, paying particular attention to the potential role of restrictive institutions.
Much of the energy around the issue of income inequality concerns the existence of an efficiency-equity trade-off: is it possible to do well while doing good? The model suggests that whether a trade-off exists depends on which dimension of policy one considers. Along the dimension that corresponds to variations in redistributive policy, such a trade off appears to hold. While decreasing inequality, increases in the intensity of redistributive policies will tend to blunt incentives for accumulation and slow growth. In considering the reform of policies that restrict access to the formal sector, however, no such trade-off exists. Lowering barriers to formal sector participation reduces inequality while raising income levels and growth rates.
Appendix
This appendix derives the equation for the Gini coefficient. To simplify the computation, we exploit similarities in steady state incomes to write: The complexity of this expression makes it difficult to sign comparative statics on inequality precisely. In addition, it is well-known from work on the Kuznets hypothesis that in dual economies inequality rises and then falls as one sector's share goes from zero to one, e.g. Robinson (1976) . Finding the sector share that constitutes maximum inequality involves solving a fourth order polynomial. In lieu of this, I establish a range of parameter values that constitute sufficient conditions to sign the comparative static.
The desired effects are that inequality rises in the barriers to formality and falls in the tax rate: Noting that a'(τ) > 0, inequality is decreasing in the tax rate for β < ¾.
